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Transparency, Accountability, and
Competency: An Essay on the Obama
Administration, Google Government,
and the Difficulties of Securing
Effective Governance
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.*
I'll tip my hat to the new constitution
Take a bow for the new revolution
Smile and grin at the change all around
Pick up my guitar and play,
Just like yesterday
Then I'll get on my knees and pray
We don't get fooled again
Don't get fooled again,
No, no!
Yeah!
Meet the new boss
Same as the old boss'
I. INTRODUCTION
As a presidential candidate, then-Senator Barack Obama promised,
if elected, to oversee the most transparent administration in history.2 An
* John S. Stone Chair, Director of Faculty Research and Professor of Law, University of
Alabama School of Law. This Essay derives from my presentation at the University of Miami Law
Review's symposium on "What Change Will Come?: The Obama Administration and the
Administrative State," held on January 30, 2010, at the University of Miami in Coral Gables,
Florida. I wish to thank the Editors for inviting me to participate in both the symposium and the
symposium edition of the University of Miami Law Review. I also wish to acknowledge the
generous support of the University of Alabama Law School Foundation, which facilitated this
research project with a summer research grant. As always, any errors or onissions are my
responsibility alone.
1. THE WHO, Won't Get Fooled Again, on WHO's NExT (MCA Records 1971).
2. See Campaign 2008/Campaign Notebook, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 21, 2007, at A14
("Obama, touting his message of changing Washington, told a roundtable of independent voters he
would not to [sic] let his administration's aides lobby him once they leave, would make
government transparent and cut out lobbyists' influence."); Peter G. Gosselin & Peter Nicholas,
Clinton Lays Out New Healthcare Overhaul, L.A. TIMEs (Sept. 18, 2007), at At (quoting
candidate Obama as stating that "[t]he real key to passing any healthcare reform is the ability to
bring people together in an open, transparent process that builds a broad consensus for change.");
Jim Rutenberg, Spokesman in Waiting After Work in Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at A 18
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Obama Administration, he promised, would ensure that evil lobbyists
would not be permitted to advance the causes of certain unnamed, but
certainly nefarious "special interests." Consistent with this pledge, Sena-
tor Obama refused to accept political donations from lobbyists and also
pledged to limit the influence of registered lobbyists in his
administration.'
Certainly, in an era marked by the failure of the regulatory state to
adequately regulate risk in the financial markets,4 particularly in the
markets for home mortgages,5 a promise to run a transparent administra-
tion constituted a prudent electoral strategy. By running against "insid-
ers" and Wall Street, and in favor of average American families and
"Main Street," candidate Obama was simply practicing smart politics. In
particular, candidate Obama repeatedly suggested that the best way to
thwart the undue influence of special interests would be to ensure that
government operates in an open and transparent manner.6 He pledged, if
elected, to do just that.
Upon taking office in January 2009, President Obama quickly
worked to realize these promises. For example, he immediately initiated
a major review of government policies related to control of information
(noting candidate Obama's promise of transparency and quoting campaign spokesman Jim Gibbs
after the election reiterating that "'[tihe president-elect has pledged to be open, transparent and
accessible'").
3. See, e.g., Patrick Healy, Obama and Edwards Engage, Gently, on Special Interests, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 18, 2007, at A26 ("Speaking in northwest Iowa, Mr. Obama said, 'Senator Edwards,
who is a good guy, he's been talking a lot about 'I'm going to fight the lobbyists and the special
interests in Washington." But, Mr. Obama reminded his audience, it was he who led a drive for an
ethics overhaul in the Senate this year."); Michael Luo & Christopher Drew, Big Donors, Too,
Have Seats At Obama Fund-Raising Table, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2008, at Al ("Mr. Obama has
pledged not to accept donations from lobbyists or political action committees registered with the
federal government."); Dan Morain & Thomas Hamburger Obama Dogged by Ties to Donor, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 23, 2008, at Al ("Today, Obama campaigns for president as a new kind of politician,
less beholden to special interests than his opponents. He and his staff regularly contrast his policy
of refusing to accept donations from lobbyists with Clinton's practices."); Lynn Sweet, Not 'in my
White House': Obama Softens Stump Speech Pledge Not to Employ Lobbyists, CHI. SUN TIMEs,
Dec. 16, 2007, at A24 ("On a blitz through northeastern Iowa since Thursday, people continually
asked Obama about how he could curb the power of lobbyists and special interests. His simple,
compelling, but, it turns out, incomplete answer-ban them from the White House-earns him
applause.").
4. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure (Part I),
104 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 398 (2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2010/14/LRColI2OOnl4Arewa.pdf; Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial
Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1 (2010).
5. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure (Part III),
104 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 441, 447-51 (2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.
edullawreview/colloquy/2010/16/LRColl2O1Onl6Arewa.pdf; Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law
of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEwiS & CLARK
L. Rev. 1035, 1036-45, 1070-75 (2010).
6. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
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possessed by the government.' Promising "a clean break from business
as usual," President Obama also established new guidelines limiting
future lobbying by members of his administration.'
Politics and governance, however, are different endeavors. Indeed,
politics, which in the modern-era largely consists of building up a brand
image through a carefully orchestrated mass media campaign,' is much
easier to do well than actually governing. Governing, under the best of
circumstances, is difficult because so many questions inevitably produce
win-lose outcomes. Those who will benefit from new government poli-
cies will certainly advocate for them, but just as surely those who will
suffer from them will work against them with equal vigor. Moving from
the baseline can be very difficult, and sometimes proves to be
impossible.
Health care reform provides a useful illustration of these principles,
and these inevitable conflicts, in action. As a candidate for president,
Senator Obama repeatedly pledged to oversee the enactment and imple-
mentation of comprehensive national health care reform legislation.
Consistent with his populist, outsider appeal to voters, he also promised,
over a half dozen times, that all negotiations related to the comprehen-
sive health care legislation would be, quite literally, carried live on cable
television: "We'll have the negotiations televised on C-SPAN . . . ."'o Of
course, transparency in theory can often prove to be an easier proposi-
tion than transparency in practice, as President Obama learned during
the long legislative slog toward a bill capable of securing passage in
both houses of Congress." And, when the final negotiations over the
7. See infra Section m and accompanying text.
8. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, On First Day, Obama Quickly Sets a New Tone, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 2009, at Al ("Mr. Obama called the moves, which overturned two policies of his predecessor,
'a clean break from business as usual.' Coupled with Tuesday's Inaugural Address, which
repudiated the Bush administration's decisions on everything from science policy to fighting
terrorism, the actions were another sign of the new president's effort to emphasize an across-the-
board shift in priorities, values and tone.").
9. See T.E. PATTERSON & R.D. MCCLURE, POLITICAL ADVERTISING: VOTER REACTION TO
TELEVISED POLITICAL COMMERCIALS 7 (1974) ("Critics contend that televised ads fail to provide
the voters meaningful information, that they degrade the electoral process by selling candidates as
if they were soap, that they emphasize image-making while ignoring political issues, and that they
are designed to influence the least interested-and most easily misled-voters."); Timothy J.
Moran, Format Restrictions on Televised Political Advertising: Elevating Political Debate
Without Suppressing Free Speech, 67 IND. L.J. 663, 664-73 (1992) (noting the shortcomings of
political campaigns based on 30-second television and radio advertisements that mimic the
techniques used to sell mass-produced commercial products).
10. See Meredith Oakley, Editorial, Then and Now in Game of Politics, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZET-E, Apr. 2, 2010, at 19 (quoting then-candidate Obama on this point and noting that "[w]ell,
as we all know, it didn't happen.").
11. See Erica Warner, C-SPAN Remark Bedevils President, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Jan. 7, 2010, at A4.
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precise content of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 2
took place between the White House and the Democratic congressional
leadership, the negotiations were not carried live on C-SPAN, contrary
to the President's earlier promise.' 3
It would be easy to take pot shots at the Obama Administration for
this about-face, but doing so would not advance our understanding of the
relationship between transparency and governance very much, if at all.
As a preliminary matter, however, it seems to me that one cannot, ex
ante, know in a given circumstance whether transparency will advance
or impede the goal of effective, competent governance. I suspect that in
some cases transparency might enhance the probability of a positive out-
come, but that in other cases it might have an opposite effect. In any
given case, then, it is impossible to know whether transparency, by
itself, will enhance or impede the project of good governance.14
Nevertheless, since taking office, the Obama Administration has
worked assiduously to advance three general principles in the operation
of executive departments and administrative agencies: "transparency,
public participation, and collaboration."" Although it is certainly true
that the ends do not inevitably justify the means used to achieve them,
results matter. For myself, a focus on substance, rather than process,
recommends itself as the primary metric for judging the performance of
federal agencies."6 To date, however, the Obama Administration seems
more interested in and concerned with matters of process, including ini-
tiatives aimed at making the business of the various agencies of the fed-
eral government more open to the general public in conjunction with
efforts to encourage citizen engagement with the federal government in
agency decision-making. Whether these process-based goals will lead to
better governance, however, remains a point open to debate.
This Essay considers the Obama Administration's transparency and
open-government initiatives. It also considers the ways in which the
Obama Administration has arguably failed to live up to its promises of
12. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
13. See supra note 10.
14. See CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY (1990). But cf Patricia M. Wald, The "New Administrative Law"-With the Same
Old Judges In It?, 1991 DUKE L.J. 647, 657-59 (1991) (questioning the ability of federal judges to
work in partnership with executive branch personnel to achieve Edley's collaborative vision in the
service of effective governance).
15. Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Transparency Memorandum).
16. See Peter H. Schuck, Book Review, Is a Competent Federal Government Becoming
Oxymoronic?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 973 (2009); see also EDLEY, supra note 14.
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open, transparent government in some important specific instances."
Finally, it considers the potential utility of transparency and open gov-
ernment to securing effective, competent governance." Although it
would be quite wrong to focus solely on outcomes, and to ignore the
importance of process entirely, in the end citizens want and expect a
competent, effective, and reasonably efficient federal government.19
Rather than commit to generic process values that will apply always and
everywhere, it might advance the project of good governance more
effectively if the administration were to tailor process, at least to some
degree, to the precise nature of the problem at issue.20
II. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
As a native of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, with deep and long-
standing ties to New Orleans, the perils of an incompetent government
are perhaps more obvious to me than they might otherwise be. If anyone
needs an object lesson in the importance of administrative competence,
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina speaks volumes about the ill effects
of incompetent agency action.
FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina's aftermath, both in New
Orleans and also along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, was more than just a
failure by a single government administrator, Michael "Brownie, you're
doing a heckuva job" Brown.2 1 Instead, failure to respond effectively to
Katrina constituted the failure of an entire administrative agency to think
carefully about the logistical requirements of a worst-case scenario hur-
ricane along the central Gulf Coast. To blame a single administrator
would be convenient, easy, and perhaps even deeply satisfying, but the
17. See infra Section IV and accompanying notes.
18. See infra Section V and accompanying notes.
19. See Schuck, supra note 16, at 973-76, 991 (arguing that the Bush Administration failed to
deliver competent and effective government services reliably and failed systematically in a
number of important cases, creating a "sink of incompetence (or worse)" at the federal level of
government).
20. I do not mean to suggest that process values are irrelevant; in many cases, well-designed
agency procedures can and will help to ensure desirable outcomes. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Instead, my more limited
point is that we care about procedure primarily, although not exclusively, because of the
relationship between process and outcomes. In fact, academic literature probably overstates the
importance of substance and understates the contributions of process to good policy outcomes. See
Schuck, supra note 16, at 975 ("It is the substantive merits and politics of policy proposals that
almost always dominates public debates, not the often invisible, mundane processes of public
administration."). As Professor Schuck has noted, "[w]hereas the substance of policy design is
considered sexy, the process of policy administration is usually seen as, well, boring." Id.
21. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Orphaned, N.Y. TBmEs MAG., Aug. 27, 2006, at 26; Eric Lipton
& Scott Shane, Homeland Security Chief Defends Federal Response, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 4, 2005, at
A26; Editorial, Mr. Bush's Storm, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at A28.
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problem demonstrated by FEMA's abject incompetence was-and
remains-a great deal more complicated.
FEMA's failure had many authors. They included not only Michael
Brown, but also professional staff at FEMA, prior FEMA directors, and
the relevant committees of jurisdiction in Congress that conducted
meaningful oversight of the agency only after the disaster of the Louisi-
ana Superdome and Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Convention Center.
And one should not forget the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the gov-
ernment agency responsible for both the construction and maintenance
of the protective levee system around metropolitan New Orleans. To this
list, one can and should also add the congressional committees charged
with oversight of both FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
It would be convenient to reduce the failure of government to
address human suffering on a catastrophic scale to President George W.
Bush simply making a bad choice for a FEMA director and to the Senate
erring by confirming this pick. However, for better or worse, for an
entity like FEMA to fail so spectacularly entails more than a single bad
pick at the top. So, if you ask, "why should we care about administrative
competence?," my response would be because lives, perhaps your life,
or the life of a family member or friend, might well depend on it.
Moreover, these systemic failures of governance are not particu-
larly rare, which is a very good reason indeed to spend considerable time
and energy thinking about issues associated with administrative compe-
tence. Focusing, for the moment, solely on the central Gulf Coast, the
recent Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster, and subsequent massive oil
spill, provide another object lesson in administrative failure.22 It would
be tempting to assess all blame for the oil rig's failure and subsequent
spill on BP, or on the subcontractors BP retained to work on the
Macando well,23 but this would simply invite history to repeat itself at
some point in the not-too-distant future.
One could add to the villains list the Minerals Management Service
(MMS), a division of the Department of the Interior. We have learned,
through the work of investigative journalists, that the MMS maintained
entirely inappropriate relationships with the entities it was ostensibly
22. See Neil King, Jr. & Keith Johnson, Obama Decried, Then Used, Some Bush Drilling
Policies, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2010, at Al. The Obama administration, in fact, simply continued
the policies of the prior administration. Id. ("But, once in office, President Obama ended up
backing offshore drilling, bowing to political and fiscal realities, even as his administration's own
scientists and Democratic lawmakers warned about its risks.").
23. See Ben Casselman & Spencer Swartz, BP Report Pins Most of Blame on Others, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 9, 2010, at A4; Russell Gold, Halliburton Faulted Over Cement Job, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 9, 2010, at A4.
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supposed to be regulating.24 MMS employees received free trips and
even illicit drugs and the services of paid sex workers from industry
representatives. In turn, the MMS turned a blind eye on various and
sundry applications for drilling permits. Thus, the emergency response
documents for multiple major oil companies operating in the Gulf of
Mexico included assessments of damage to wildlife that encompassed
walruses, a marine animal that does not inhabit the Gulf of Mexico.25
Because the agency failed to exercise meaningful oversight and review
over these applications, those engaged in Gulf drilling were not required
to have a viable emergency response plan should a worst-case oil rig
failure occur.
It is obvious and easy to condemn trading oil-drilling permits for
trips to Las Vegas and high quality cocaine. But the failure of the MMS
runs much deeper than simply a portrait of agency capture.2 6 Where was
24. See John M. Broder, U.S. to Split Up Agency Policing the Oil Industry, N.Y. TimEs, May
12, 2010, at Al (reporting on "revelations two years ago that some minerals management officials
in Colorado accepted gifts, trips, drugs and sexual favors from oil company representatives" and
noting that "[t]he Interior Department's inspector general found numerous abuses and
characterized the agency as an ethical wasteland."). The specific allegations involving gifts of
illicit drugs and prostitutes involved MMS branch offices in Colorado and Louisiana. See Alec
MacGillis, Get Out of Town!: The Case for Breaking Up the Federal Government-and Scattering
It Beyond the Beltway, WASH. POST, July 25, 2010, at BI (noting that "it was Colorado and
Louisiana branches of the Minerals Management Service that were recently implicated in scandals
involving drug use, prostitution and fraternizing with energy industry officials.").
25. See Ian Urbina, At Issue in Gulf: Who Was in Charge?, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2010, at Al
("The rig's 'spill response plan,' provided to The Times, includes a Web link for a contractor that
goes to an Asian shopping Web site and also mentions the importance of protecting walruses,
seals and sea lions, none of which inhabit the area of drilling. The agency approved the plan.");
Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Lawmakers Attack Companies' Spill Plans: 'Cookie-Cutter'
Strategies Quote Outdated Data, Give Contact Info for Dead Expert, WASH. POST, June 16, 2010,
at Al ("The government-mandated plans all came under attack at a congressional hearing
Tuesday: Three of them listed the phone number for the same University of Miami marine science
expert, Peter Lutz, who died in 2005. Four talked about the need to protect walruses, which, as
Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) dryly noted, 'have not called the Gulf of Mexico home for 3
million years.' The plans also mentioned protecting sea lions and seals, which aren't found in the
gulf, either."). Obviously, if anyone had reviewed the response plans with even a modicum of
care, the cookie-cutter nature of the plans, and the failure to address the problems specific to Gulf
wildlife and flora, would have been obvious, indeed, totally self-evident. The inescapable
conclusion, then, is that no one at MMS ever bothered to review the oil spill response plans
seriously.
26. See Tennille Tracy, Offshore-Drilling Agency Overwhelmed, Officials Say, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 9, 2010, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870345380457
5479752398200726.html?KEYWORDS=federal+agency+that+regulates+offshore+drilling+rarely
+conducted ("The federal agency that regulates offshore drilling rarely conducted unannounced
inspections, allowed oil-rig operators to shop around for favorable decisions and gave its
inspectors financial incentives for speeding up application approvals, according to an internal
report released Wednesday by the Interior Department."); see also OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
SAFETY OVERSIGHT BoARO, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR 6-16, 20-26 (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PagelD=43677.
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the internal oversight of the MMS from within the Department of the
Interior? In particular, where was the Interior Department's Office of
Inspector General? The problems with the MMS were well documented
in the press,27 yet neither the Bush Administration nor the Obama
Administration took any affirmative steps to bring the agency to book
until after the Deep Water Horizon disaster and spill. Once again, this is
a case not merely of one agency failing to do its job, but rather of an
entire cabinet department failing to meet the minimum expectation of
competence, with the people and wildlife of the Gulf region paying the
price of the Interior Department's systemic failure, just as the people of
the region paid the price five years earlier for FEMA's incompetence in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
And, in this case, the errors did not begin and end with the MMS
approving the Deepwater Horizon drilling project based on shoddy sci-
entific and technological analyses of BP's proposed spill response. The
Obama Administration's immediate policy response to the oil spill, a
categorical ban on all deepwater offshore drilling, had as much to do
with managing public relations as with managing drilling policy based
on sound science.2 8 The ban could jeopardize as many as 23,000 jobs.2 9
Although it is certainly true that drilling permits should not be issued
based on form filings and inadequate emergency response plans, a flat
ban on granting any deepwater drilling permits, without any sound sci-
entific basis, seems equally misguided; we need domestic oil production
in the United States. What was-and is-needed is not closure of off-
shore drilling operations, but rather effective administrative oversight of
the enterprise.o
27. See, e.g., Mark Jaffe & David Olinger, Minerals Management Service: Drilling Overseer
Dysfunctional From the Start, DENv. POST, June 6, 2010, at Al.
28. Stephen Power & Leslie Eaton, U.S. Saw Drill Ban Killing Many Jobs, WALL ST. J., Aug.
21, 2010, at Al.
29. Id.
30. See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010)
(invalidating as arbitrary and capricious the Department of Interior's emergency six month
moratorium on all offshore deepwater drilling issued on May 28, 2010). The court held that
"[a]fter reviewing the Secretary's Report, the Moratorium Memorandum, and the Notice to
Lessees, the Court is unable to divine or fathom a relationship between the findings and the
immense scope of the moratorium." Id. at 637. As Judge Feldman explains:
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill is an unprecedented, sad, ugly and inhuman
disaster. What seems clear is that the federal government has been pressed by what
happened on the Deepwater Horizon into an otherwise sweeping confirmation that
all Gulf deepwater drilling activities put us all in a universal threat of irreparable
harm. While the implementation of regulations and a new culture of safety are
supportable by the Report and the documents presented, the blanket moratorium,
with no parameters, seems to assume that because one rig failed and although no
one yet fully knows why, all companies and rigs drilling new wells over 500 feet
also universally present an imminent danger.
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It would also be a mistake, when assigning blame, to stop with the
Executive Branch of the federal government. Congress, again, has a duty
to conduct regular and meaningful oversight of federal executive agen-
cies, including the Department of the Interior and the MMS. 1 The com-
mittees of jurisdiction in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate bear no less responsibility than the Department of the Interior or
the White House for permitting a lax and obviously corrupt culture take
root in the MMS. Congress has a co-equal role to play in securing good
governance by holding executive agencies accountable and maintaining
a meaningful level of oversight that incents agencies to perform their
duties in a timely and effective fashion.32 In the case of MMS, as in the
case of the pre-Katrina FEMA, Congress also failed to do its job ade-
quately or effectively.
The federal government's response to Hurricane Katrina and to the
Deepwater Horizon disaster raise serious issues of competence. It is easy
to make grand pronouncements about the importance of "transparency,
public participation, and collaboration," but at the end of the day, would
a more transparent, participatory, or collaborative administrative process
at FEMA or MMS have averted these systemic governmental failures? If
so, then by all means, these values should be comprehensively incorpo-
rated into the DNA of agency operations across all levels and depart-
ments of the federal administrative state. If not, then perhaps we should
seek a different focus. A focus, for example, on administrative compe-
tence and accountability.
In the case of FEMA, Michael Brown resigned his position quickly
after the agency's failure to meet the challenge presented by post-
Katrina recovery efforts in both New Orleans and along the central Gulf
coast. 3 3 On the other hand, Secretary Michael Chertoff, then the head of
the Department of Homeland Security, of which FEMA is a constituent
part, kept his position, largely without controversy. 34 The operation in
Id. at 638. The reasons for the blanket moratorium thus had more to do with effective public
relations than with sound science or rational governance.
31. See Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair the "Broken Branch"?, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 765, 773-87, 791-93 (2009).
32. See, e.g., THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How CONGRESS
Is FAILING AMERICA AND How To GET IT BACK ON TRACK 15-18 (2006). Mann and Ornstein
argue that Congress, at least in periods of unified control of Congress and the White House, has
ceased taking its constitutional oversight duties seriously, instead viewing itself, essentially, as
part of the president's team. See id. at 155.
33. See Richard W. Stevenson, After Days of Criticism, Emergency Director Resigns, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 13, 2005, at A26.
34. See Abby Goodnough, Chertoff Pushes for More Hurricane Readiness, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
13, 2006, at A16 ("Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said Wednesday that he would
assign federal disaster-management officials to vulnerable regions before the hurricane season
begins June 1, to help local governments prepare for potential storms."). Ironically, perhaps,
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New Orleans was effectively militarized, with General Russel L. Honor6
taking control of a centralized rescue and response operation in the
flooded neighborhoods of the Crescent City. 5
The response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster took a similar path,
with the director of the MMS resigning her position, but with higher ups
within the Department of Interior not facing any serious scrutiny for
their failure to reign in MMS before disaster struck on April 20, 2010.6
For example, Department of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar remained in
his position even though he had almost 18 months in which to initiate
some effort at reforming the MMS, but failed to act effectively. Thus, as
former FEMA director Michael Brown attended the meeting at which Secretary Chertoff spoke
and provided an alternative analysis of where matters involving hurricane preparedness stood:
Michael D. Brown, the former director of FEMA who resigned under fire after
Hurricane Katrina, attended the conference and told reporters that none of the
planned improvements would work unless the agency separated from the
Department of Homeland Security. He said FEMA's new director, R. David
Paulison, was well intentioned but would be ineffective if he had to report to Mr.
Chertoff.
"The problem is that within the Department of Homeland Security you are stifled in
what you can do," said Mr. Brown, now a private consultant, who said he was
visiting several clients at the conference. "I think Chief Paulison's going to have a
difficult time because he's going to be told what he can say and what he can do.
And once again, there will be no accountability and people will suffer."
Id. Thus, even in the context of an abject government failure on the scale of the federal
government's response to Hurricane Katrina, the government still possesses an irresistible urge to
identify a scapegoat (in this instance, Michael Brown), announce that the problem has been
solved, and to move on without holding anyone else within the organization accountable for the
agency's shortcomings. Why Secretary Chertoff escaped any serious professional repercussions
for the Department of Homeland Security's botched Katrina response remains a mystery. Today,
Chertoff works as a paid security consultant and works to sell full body scanners to the federal
government, often without bothering to mention his direct financial interest in promoting these
devices on his client's behalf. See Clark Hoyt, The Sources' Stake in News, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17,
2010, at WK8 (noting that Chertoff granted the New York Times an interview about the Christmas
2009 "underwear bomber," during which "he said full-body scanners should be deployed at
airports" and observing that "Chertoff, the former secretary of homeland security, did not
volunteer that he is a consultant to a company that makes such equipment" at the time of the
interview).
35. Anne E. Kornblut, Bush Tours Sites of Gulf Revitalization, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at
A19; see also Lynne Duke, The Category 5 General, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2005, at Cl. In point
of fact, the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA both failed, miserably, to make
adequate preparations for the impact of Hurricane Katrina, and the intra-agency squabbling that
took place prior to the hurricane's landfall along the Mississippi-Louisiana state line, on August
29, 2005, presents a portrait of administrative failure. See Spencer S. Hsu, Messages Depict
Disarray in Federal Katrina Response, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2005, at All.
36. Juliet Eilperin & Madonna Lebling, Minerals Management Service's Troubles, WASH.
POST, May 29, 2010, at A8 (reporting that Elizabeth Birnbaum, director of the MMS, resigned her
position on May 27, 2010, after the Deepwater Horizon disaster, and also noting a litany of
problems at the agency dating back to 2008). As with Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar retained his position, and did so without much
controversy.
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with the Department of Homeland Security in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, a subordinate officer within the agency took the fall for the
agency's failure to perform its duties adequately.
In thinking about the nuts and bolts of how government actually
works on a day-to-day basis, it is well and good to make blanket pro-
nouncements, such as "lobbyists have too much influence" or "govern-
ment should be transparent." These global claims might well be true in
many instances. But, surely, they are not universal truths. Moreover, in
at least some cases adherence to a firm commitment to a particular pro-
cess value might well impede, perhaps even render impossible, the
attainment of specific substantive policy objectives. When these generic,
ostensibly universal commitments conflict with the attainment of crucial
government objectives, such as responding to a national disaster, it
might prove necessary to make a hard choice between maintaining a pre-
existing commitment to particular procedural rule or, in the alternative,
abandoning process in order to better achieve a particular goal. This is
not to say that the ends government seeks to achieve always and invaria-
bly justify the means used to achieve them, but rather that a certain flexi-
bility might prove essential to maximizing the possibility of effective
outcomes, at least in some cases.
m. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES
The Obama Administration has sought to make a clean break with
the secretive practices observed by the George W. Bush Administration.
And, on the whole, the formal policies of the Obama Administration
reflect a logical and comprehensive government-wide commitment to
transparency and openness.
President Obama has strong ideas about a necessary condition for
achieving effective governance-he believes, at least in general, that
government should be "transparent," "participatory," and "collabora-
tive."" Indeed, on his first day on the job, January 21, 2009, President
Obama issued two memoranda that set forth his vision of how better to
achieve effective government." Given the scope and breadth of these
open government initiatives, this project, and this general policy com-
mitment to operating the federal government in an open and transparent
37. Transparency Memorandum, supra note 15, at 4685.
38. See Transparency Memorandum, supra note 15; Freedom of Information Act:
Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter FOIA Memorandum].
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fashion, plainly reflect an important administrative law priority for the
new administration.
A. The Initiative To Increase the Transparency and Openness of the
Federal Government
The first major Obama Administration initiative on increasing the
accessibility, and hence accountability, of the federal government, enti-
tled "Transparency and Open Government," announces that the Obama
Administration "is committed to creating an unprecedented level of
openness in government" and "[w]e will work together to ensure the
public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation,
and collaboration."4 0 Why do these things? Because "[o]penness will
strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in
Government."41
President Obama directed this memorandum to the heads of execu-
tive departments and agencies. In it, he instructed every agency subject
to direct presidential control to undertake initiatives aimed at enhancing
the transparency of the entities' operations, expanding opportunities for
citizen participation in the day-to-day operations of government, and to
facilitate "collaborative" interactions between government agencies, pri-
vate enterprise, and the general public.42
B. A Presumption in Favor of Disclosure of Government-
Held Information
The second major open government initiative, also announced on
January 21, 2009, involves the way the federal government processes
information requests filed under the auspices of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA).43 On his first day in office, President Obama signed a
second memorandum, addressing the new administration's policy
toward FOIA requests, that constitutes a radical break from the notori-
ously secrecy-oriented George W. Bush Administration."
39. See Cheryl Bolen, Sunstein Claims New Approach to Regulation Under Obama Watch, 78
U.S.L. WKLY. 2738, 2739 (2010) (reporting OIRA Administrator Cass R. Sunstein's observation
that the Obama Administration's transparency initiatives constitute one of the three or four most
important administrative process initiatives and also his assertion that "the administration has
promoted transparency and open government in unprecedented ways," including "using disclosure
as a low-cost, high-impact regulatory tool . . . .").
40. Transparency Memorandum, supra note 15, at 4685.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
44. FOIA Memorandum, supra note 38, at 4683.
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In this memorandum, President Obama explains that:
A democracy requires accountability, and accountability requires
transparency. As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote, "sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants." In our democracy, the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA), which encourages accountability through trans-
parency, is the most prominent expression of a profound national
commitment to ensuring an open Government. At the heart of that
commitment is the idea that accountability is in the interest of the
Government and the citizenry alike.45
Thus, the Obama Administration clearly links the concepts of disclosure
and accountability, arguing that without disclosure, accountability
becomes more difficult to maintain.
To be sure, this is an important document that establishes a high bar
in favor of disclosure of government-held information.4 6 Indeed, the
memorandum orders a reversal of the Bush Administration's policy of
broadly defending agency refusals to share government information with
the public, provided that a plausible legal basis for the secrecy claim
existed, in favor of a rule that provides, "[a]ll agencies should adopt a
presumption in favor of disclosure, in order to renew their commitment
to the principles embodied in FOIA, and to usher in a new era of open
Government."4 7 Moreover, "[t]he presumption of disclosure should be
applied to all decisions involving FOIA."48 The memorandum also
includes a mandate to adopt new, information-seeker friendly rules and a
general mandate that "[a]ll agencies should use modern technology to
inform citizens about what is known and done by their Government."4 9
In turn, Attorney General Eric Holder, in a memorandum dated
March 19, 2009, issued specific interagency guidelines on the use of
FOIA exemptions, including exemptions to protect information related
to national security, personal privacy, privileged records, and law
enforcement interests.5 0 The new guidelines admonish agencies not to
withhold information because an agency "can demonstrate, as a techni-
cal matter, that the records fall within the scope of a FOIA exemption"
and to consider "whether it can make a partial disclosure" when a full
disclosure is not possible, thereby overturning the Department of Jus-
tice's prior policy standard of defending an agency decision to refuse to
45. Id.
46. See id. ("The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with a clear
presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails.").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. FOIA Memorandum, supra note 38, at 4683.
50. Office of the Attorney Gen., Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): Memorandum to the
Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Holder FOIA Memorandum],
http://www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf.
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comply with a FOIA request whenever "a sound legal basis" existed for
so doing in favor of a presumption of disclosure.5' As Attorney General
Holder states the new policy, "an agency should not withhold informa-
tion simply because it may do so legally."5 2
The Holder FOIA Memorandum expressly rescinds the prior
Department of Justice FOIA Memorandum, issued by then-Attorney
General John Ashcroft on October 12, 2001, under which the Depart-
ment of Justice announced a policy of defending any refusal to comply
with a FOIA request provided that the decision did not "lack a sound
legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the abil-
ity of other agencies to protect other important records."" Under the
new policy, the Department of Justice will defend refusals of FOIA
requests "only if (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure
would harm an interest protected by one of the statutory exemptions, or
(2) disclosure is prohibited by law."54
The Holder FOIA Memorandum also establishes a policy of volun-
tary, proactive disclosure of government information: Under the new
policy, "agencies should readily and systematically post information
online in advance of any public request."" The idea behind this initia-
tive is that "[p]roviding more information online reduces the need for
individualized requests and may help reduce existing [FOIA request]
backlogs."56
C. The Open Government Directive Initiative
In addition to its general call for transparency, participation, and
collaboration, and its new FOIA-friendly policies, the Obama adminis-
tration also has revised the rules governing classified information and
adopted an open government directive. As President Obama explained
these initiatives, "a democratic government accountable to the people
must be as transparent as possible and must not withhold information for
self-serving reasons or simply to avoid embarrassment.""
On May 27, 2009, President Obama initiated a review of govern-
ment policies regarding classified and controlled information.58 and on
51. See id. at 1-2.
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id. at 1-2.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id.
57. Classified Information and Controlled Unclassified Information: Memorandum for the
Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 26277 (June 1, 2009) [hereinafter Classified
Information Memorandum]; see also Carrie Johnson, Review of Government Secrecy Ordered,
WASH. POST, May 28, 2009, at A3.
58. See Classified Information Memorandum, supra note 57, at 26277.
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December 29, 2009, he issued Executive Order 13,526, which totally
revises the federal government's system of classifying information.
Like the Obama administration's new and improved FOIA policies, its
policies on classifying information as secret incorporate a presumption
in favor of disclosure and against classification. 6 0 Moreover, informa-
tion, even if classified, must be listed for automatic declassification
within a specific time frame or event; the default rule calls for declassifi-
cation within ten years generally and twenty-five years for "sensitive"
information. 1
Executive Order 13,526 prohibits classification of information to
"conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error," to
"prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency," or for
other improper purposes.6 2 Significantly, Executive Order 13,526 also
prohibits classification of "basic scientific research information" and, to
be classified, information must be "owned by, produced by or for, or is
under the control of the United States government."6 3
In adopting Executive Order 13,526, President Obama explained,
"[o]ur democratic principles require that the American people be
informed of the activities of their Government."' Moreover, "our
Nation's progress depends on the free flow of information both within
the Government and to the American people."65
After President Obama announced that his "open government direc-
tive" was to be implemented by the OMB, OMB Director Peter Orszag
released memorandum M-10-06 on December 8, 2009,66 along with a
report entitled "Open Government: A Progress Report to the American
People." 67
59. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5 2010) [hereinafter Exec. Order No.
13,526]. For an overview of the Obama administration's policies on national security secrets, see
William H. Leary, Promoting Openness and Accountability by Making Classification a Two-Way
Street, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 29, 2009, 2:38 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
2009/12/29/open/promoting-openness-and-accountability-making-classfication-a-two-way-street.
60. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, supra note 59, at 707 ("[i]f there is significant doubt about
the need to classify information, it shall not be classified.").
61. See id. at 709.
62. See id. at 710.
63. See id. at 707, 710.
64. Id. at 707.
65. Id. at 707.
66. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. No. M- 10-
06: MEMORANDUM TO THE HEADS OF ExEc. DEP'TS AND AGENCIES (2009) [hereinafter Orszag
Memorandum].
67. OPEN GOVERNMENT: A PROGRESs REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2009) [hereinafter
OMB Report], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ogi-progress-report-
american-people.pdf.
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The OMB will be requiring federal agencies to adopt more trans-
parent operating procedures that facilitate public input and participation.
As Orszag states the matter, "[p]articipation allows members of the pub-
lic to contribute ideas and expertise so that their government can make
policies with the benefit of information that is widely dispersed in soci-
ety."" The OMB has mandated that "to increase accountability, promote
informed participation by the public, and create economic opportunity,
each agency shall take prompt steps to expand access to information by
making it available online in open formats" and must also adopt a "pre-
sumption . . . in favor of openness."" The mandate is meant to "create
an unprecedented and sustained level of openness and accountability in
every agency." 0 In turn, the OMB's report on open government
describes various other White House initiatives, such as releasing White
House visitor logs (a policy that the White House originally rejected and
contested in federal court).
68. Id. at 1.
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id. at 2 ("Most recently, the White House, for the first time ever, began publishing the
names of everyone who visits the White House."). What the OMB Report fails to mention is that
the White House adopted the policy after losing litigation pending in federal district court. The
Obama Administration initially refused to disclose these records to the public. See Bill Dedman,
Obama Blocks List of Visitors to White House, MSNBC.com (June 16, 2009, 4:54 PM), http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31373407 ("The Obama administration is fighting to block access to
names of visitors to the White House, taking up the Bush administration argument that a president
doesn't have to reveal who comes calling to influence policy decisions."); Josh Gerstein, W.H.
Defends Bush Visitors Policy, POLITICO (June 16, 2009, 11:00 PM), http://www.politico.coml
news/stories/0609/23805.html ("President Barack Obama's administration is adhering, at least for
now, to a Bush administration policy that White House visitor logs are presidential records that
the public has no right to see."). A group called Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a
judicial injunction mandating release of the White House visitor logs. See Michael D. Shear,
Group Files Suit Against Obama Administration for Access to Visitor Logs, WASH. PosT, Dec. 31,
2009, at A2. While the litigation remained pending before the federal courts, the White House
decided to change course and released the information voluntarily. See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher,
In Shift from Prior Administrations, White House to Open Visitor List, WASH. PosT, Sept. 5, 2009,
at A5. However, the district court had issued rulings suggesting that these records were subject to
mandatory disclosure under FOIA, and accordingly it is difficult to ascertain whether the White
House made a principled decision or rather attempted to make a virtue of a judicially-imposed
necessity. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 592 F. Supp. 2d 127, 131 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in
Washington v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 532 F.3d 860 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The Obama
administration actually appealed Judge Lamberth's ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. See Freedom of Information-FOI Act: Obama Commitment to
Transparency Called into Question in FOIA Litigation, 78 U.S.L.W. 1043 (2009) (noting that "the
Obama administration has appealed that ruling" and "is raising the same defenses asserted by the
Bush administration."). Ultimately, however, the Obama Administration changed course and
established a generic policy favoring release of the White House visitor logs. But, in light of the
litigation history, and particularly the appeal of Judge Lamberth's January 2009 FOIA ruling, to
call this decision entirely voluntary is to engage in an excessive amount of spin. Cf Michael D.
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The Obama Administration has also initiated a government-wide
push to require all federal agencies to maintain and utilize web-based
resources to facilitate two-way communication between agencies of the
federal government and the citizenry.72 "Data.gov is a flagship Adminis-
tration initiative intended to allow the public to easily find, access,
understand, and use data that are generated by the Federal govern-
ment." 3 As with the Administration's other transparency and accessibil-
ity initiatives, this policy initiative rests on the notion that "[a] vibrant
democracy depends on straightforward access to high quality [govern-
ment] data and tools."74 And, "[a]t the core of Data.gov is the intent to
make Federal sector data more accessible and usable," thereby
"[i]ncreasing the ability of the public to discover, understand, and use
the vast stores of government data" and enhancing "government
accountability and unlock[ing] additional economic and social value.""
D. Revisions to the State Secrets Doctrine Policy
The Department of Justice also released a revised policy on invok-
ing the state secrets doctrine as a defense in federal court litigation.
Released on September 23, 2009, Attorney General Holder's memoran-
dum limits invocation of the doctrine to circumstances in which disclo-
sure of information "reasonably could be expected to cause significant
harm to the national defense or foreign relations . . . of the United
States" and also calls for narrow tailoring of invocations of the state
secrets privilege.7 6 This constitutes a more refined standard for invoca-
tion of the doctrine than that which prevailed under the George W. Bush
Administration.7
Shear, White House Visitors Log Reflects Obama Agenda, WASH. PosT, Dec. 31, 2009, at A2
(noting that White House visitors logs have been "made public as part of President Obama's effort
to keep his promise of government transparency" but also noting that "[t]housands of entries
remain somewhat mysterious, offering no explanation for the reason for the visit, and some visits
are not disclosed at all, including those of visitors whose known presence at the White House
would pose a national security risk.").
72. See OFFICE OF E-Gov'T AND IT OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, FED. CHIEF INFO.
OFFICERS COUNCIL, DATA.GOV CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DRAFr, VERSION 0.7 (2009), http:/www.
ideascale.com/userimages/sub-1/736312/ConOpsFinal.pdf [hereinafter DATA.GOV OPERATIONS
DRAFr].
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies
and the Heads of Dep't Components 1 (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
state-secret-privileges.pdf [hereinafter Holder State Secrets Memorandum]; see also Charlie
Savage, Justice Dept. Planning to Limit Government's Use of State Secrets Privilege, N.Y. TIEs,
Sept. 23, 2009, at A16.
77. Even so, however, the Obama Administration has continued to invoke the state secrets
privilege in litigation involving claims associated with the federal government's use of
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E. The Obama Administration's Campaign To Make Government
More Transparent, Accessible, and Collaborative Plainly
Represents a Significant and Meaningful Change
of Direction from the Policies of the
Bush Administration
If one considers all of these policies in conjunction, it's clear that
the Obama Administration possesses a strong commitment, in general,
to openness, transparency, collaboration, and, in theory, accountability.
The scope of the project is impressive, and the Obama Administration
has approached questions of transparency in a consistent fashion, articu-
lating over and over again the linkage that exists between transparency,
on the one hand, and the accountability of government, on the other.
Notwithstanding the scope of this undertaking, however, it is easier
to favor transparency and openness when the question presents itself as
an abstract matter. When openness and transparency are likely to impede
the achievement of a major administration objective, such as congres-
sional enactment of a major health care reform bill, or when trans-
parency makes the administration appear to be inept in responding to a
major national crisis, such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster,
the willingness of an administration to suit its deeds to its prior words
will be tested. In many significant respects, the Obama Administration's
commitment to open and transparent government seems to be more theo-
retical than real.
extraordinary rendition, coupled with the use of torture (or, in the language of the Bush
Administration, "coercive interrogation techniques"). See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Tom Carter, Federal Appeals Court Adopts
Obama "State Secrets" Doctrine to Block Torture Case, GLOBALRESEARCH.CA (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=20969 ("The US Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals . . . dismissed a lawsuit by five victims of the CIA's 'extraordinary rendition' program
against Jeppesen Dataplan, a unit of Boeing. The six-five ruling adopts as a rationale the anti-
democratic 'state secrets' doctrine advocated by the Obama administration."); John Schwartz,
Obama Backs Off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A12 ("In a closely
watched case involving rendition and torture, a lawyer for the Obama administration seemed to
surprise a panel of federal appeals judges on Monday by pressing ahead with an argument for
preserving state secrets originally developed by the Bush administration."). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially rejected the state secrets defense and permitted the litigation
to proceed; the Obama Administration, and Attorney General Holder's Department of Justice,
sought and obtained en banc review, and prevailed on en banc review by a vote of six to five. See
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd en banc, 614 F.3d 1070
(9th Cir. 2010). Writing for the panel majority, Judge Hawkins emphatically rejected the Obama
Administration's arguments for applying the state secrets privilege in this litigation, explaining
that "[a]ccording to the government's theory, the Judiciary should effectively cordon off all secret
government actions from judicial scrutiny, immunizing the CIA and its partners from the demands
and limits of the law." Id. at 955.
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IV. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO
TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS Is FAR FROM TOTAL
Notwithstanding the seriousness and consistency with which Presi-
dent Obama and his team have worked to create general government
policies favoring transparency and disclosure, the Administration's
approach to specific issues does not always seem consistent with these
high-minded theoretical commitments. Several important examples of
the Administration resiling from its promise of transparency exist and
merit some consideration. They include the promise to conduct health
care negotiations in public (and on C-SPAN), the efforts to limit and
suppress media coverage of the environmental effects of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill disaster, and the continued invocation of the state
secrets privilege to insulate government contractors from any and all
liability associated with extraordinary renditions and human torture.
In citing these counterexamples, I do not seek to diminish or ignore
the importance of the Administration's considerable-and commenda-
ble-efforts to make government operations more transparent in an
effort to enhance accountability." However, it is very easy to proclaim
an abstract commitment to transparency and accountability, and another
matter entirely to practice these virtues when doing so will cast the
Administration in an unfavorable light. If President Obama truly values
transparency, however, his failure to consistently practice it does seem
troubling. At a minimum, it reflects a kind of hypocrisy that seems
inconsistent with his promise of overseeing a clean and accountable gov-
ernment as a presidential candidate.
At a broader level of analysis, however, the counterexamples might
well constitute exemplars of why an absolute commitment to trans-
parency is not a particularly desirable policy. In other words, if trans-
parency is the enemy either of government effectiveness or achieving
progress on a major social problem, such as the millions of uninsured
persons living in the United States, perhaps the larger lesson is that the
Administration should rethink whether transparency should be an abso-
lute, rather than relative, value.
The easiest, and perhaps most notorious, example of the Obama
Administration breaking with its promise of total transparency involves
the negotiations associated with drafting and passing a major health care
reform bill. During the 2008 presidential campaign, then-Senator Obama
repeatedly promised to run a lobbyist-free administration that would
conduct the people's business out in the open. With respect to negotia-
tions regarding the scope and content of health care legislation, Senator
78. See supra Sections II.A-D.
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Obama said that his approach "would involve 'bringing all parties
together, and broadcasting those negotiations on C-SPAN so that the
American people can see what the choices are."' 79 At a national forum
on health care reform, which, unlike the final negotiations on the health
care reform bill, was carried live on C-SPAN, Senator John McCain
noted that "eight times you said that negotiations on health-care reform
would be conducted with the C-SPAN cameras," suggesting that Presi-
dent Obama had not lived up to this campaign promise.s In point of
fact, President Obama did not honor this commitment-the negotiations
conducted on the bill took place in private, outside the view of the public
and the press."
Thus, the President's promise to televise the health care bill negoti-
ations came to naught. Despite C-SPAN President Brian Lamb's public
offer to televise the negotiations on C-SPAN, the Administration resiled
from its earlier commitment to an open process in order to ensure that
"special interests" did not secure "corrupt deals."8 2 So, it would seem
that sunshine, contrary to Justice Brandeis's admonition, is not always
the best of disinfectants; perhaps the conduct of the government's busi-
ness under the watchful gaze of the public and the press works to better
the quality of both the deliberative process and the ultimate government
policy most of the time, but not when one is negotiating legislation that
would radically expand the government's control of 1/6 of the national
economy.
It seems rather odd to require transparency in FDA proceedings to
regulate raw oysters to prevent vibrio infections," but not in the final
79. See Warner, supra note 11, at A4; see also Peter Nicholas, Transparency Pledge
Cracked: Talks on TV Were Promised; Closed Doors Are Reality, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2010, at CIO
("Instead of health care negotiations broadcast on C-SPAN, as candidate Obama famously
promised, the fate of the landmark bill is being hashed out in private. And recent polls indicate
that the public has lowered its expectations about the prospect of a more open government.");
James Rainey, Reporters' Dim View of Transparency, L.A. Tums, Jan. 20, 2010, at DI ("It's been
clear for months-and especially now as Democrats try to fashion a bill, even as a Massachusetts
senate race erases their filibuster-proof majority-that the president and the majority party have
no intention of broadcasting the healthcare endgame, if they ever did.").
80. Shailagh Murray & Anne E. Kornblut, Stark Divide on Display at Health Summit, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 26, 2010, at Al; see also Bob Keefe, Georgia GOP: Put Health Talks on TV, ATLANTA
J.-CONsT., Jan. 12, 2010, at Al ("President Barack Obama pledged repeatedly on the campaign
trail in 2008 that all of the health care debate would be televised on C-SPAN.").
81. See Nicholas, supra note 79, at C1O.
82. See Paul Greenburg, The Transformation of Barack Obama: Surprise Us, Mr. President,
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 20, 2010, at 6; Editorial, Let C-SPAN In: President Should
Keep His Campaign Promise, Encourage Televised Health Care Proceedings, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Jan. 16, 2010, at B6.
83. See Gardiner Harris, Food Agency Delays Ban on Oysters After Outcry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2009, at All.
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negotiations for the health care bill. Words certainly matter, but deeds
matter even more.
An even more disturbing example of the Obama Administration
failing to observe its self-proclaimed standards of transparency took
place over the late spring and early summer of 2010, following the cata-
strophic failure of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the waters of the
north-central Gulf of Mexico. On April 20, 2010, following a massive
explosion on the platform that killed eleven rig workers, the blowout
preventer failed and the pipes connected to the oil well began to spew
literally millions of gallons of crude oil into the waters of the Gulf of
Mexico.84
In the aftermath of the rig's failure, the environmental effects of the
disaster were inescapable, and both print and broadcast news featured
heartrending pictures of oiled turtles and sea birds." Even cable news
stations generally sympathetic to the Obama Administration, such as
MSNBC, featured increasingly critical coverage of the Administration's
response to the oil spill disaster in general and, in particular, to the
Administration's reliance on BP to lead the clean up response. The nar-
rative, in general, was that this approach put the perpetrator of a major
environmental crime in charge of treating the victims' injuries.
Sadly, it seems that all presidential administrations, regardless of
political party, are prone to suppress bad news whenever possible. In
June 2010, at the height of the negative media coverage of the govern-
ment's ineffectual efforts to stop the spill and clean up the oil, the Coast
Guard issued regulations banning anyone from approaching disaster
response team members, even on public beaches or in waters otherwise
open to the public." On June 30, 2010, the Coast Guard Unified Com-
mand responding to the Deep Water Horizon oil spill disaster issued
regulations that prohibit anyone, including journalists, from coming
within sixty-five feet (twenty meters) of any Deepwater Horizon oil dis-
aster recovery operation, including, for example, beach clean up opera-
tions and oil-resistant booms placed in coastal waters." The Federal
84. Steven Mufson, Spilled Oil Burned in Gulf in Hopes of Saving Coast, WASH. POST, Apr.
29, 2010, at Al; Susan Saulny & John M. Broder, Containment Effort Inches Closer to Oil Target,
N.Y. THMES, May 8, 2010, at A12.
85. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Sifting a Range of Suspects as Gulf Wildlife Dies, N.Y. TIES,
July 15, 2010, at Al.
86. See Patrik Jonsson, Gulf Oil Spill: Al Gore Slams BP for Lack of Media Access,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 15, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0615/
Gulf-oil-spill-Al-Gore-slams-BP-for-lack-of-media-access; Jeremy W. Peters, Efforts in Gulf of
Mexico to Limit Flow of News About the Spill, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2010, at A20.
87. See Press Release, Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint Info. Ctr., Coast Guard Establishes
20-Meter Safety Zone Around All Deepwater Horizon Protective Boom Operations (June 30,
2010), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/06/30/coast-guard-establishes-20-meter-safety-
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Aviation Administration also banned flights below 3,000 feet proximate
to the spill or recovery effort."
On July 12, 2010, after intense public criticism, the Coast Guard
revised the policy to permit "credentialed media" more liberal access to
clean up sites." While it was in force, however, the directive had the
effect of rendering it virtually impossible to photograph the adverse
environmental effects of the spill on both wildlife and beaches along the
central Gulf Coast.
Although it is entirely understandable that the Obama Administra-
tion would seek to minimize the political damage caused by its inept
response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the desire to suppress
images that could be damaging to the Administration's credibility with
the public seems unreconcilable with its earlier, and more formal, pro-
nouncements on transparent, participatory, and collaborative
governance.90
My third example is arguably the most disturbing. One could sim-
ply write off candidate Obama's promise to televise the health care leg-
islation negotiations as a poorly conceived idea that simply reflected bad
political judgment. It was a promise made during the heat of the cam-
paign, and perhaps without sufficient forethought. 91
The effort to suppress adverse press coverage of the Deepwater
Horizon disaster was both stupid and, at the same time, wholly ineffec-
tive. Given the scope of the spill, which was visible from space by satel-
lite, trying to prevent journalists from filming or speaking with beach
cleanup crews was unlikely to significantly impede the media's ability to
convey the horrific scale of the oil spill's environmental impact. Thus,
the policy, while it lasted, did very little to affect the substance of the
negative press coverage and simply made BP and the Obama Adminis-
tration appear desperate (having already proved themselves to be both
zone-around-all-deepwater-horizon-protect; see also Chris Kirkham, Coast Guard Puts Puts Up
65-Foot Cleanup Buffer, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (July 2, 2010), http://nola.1ive.advance.
net/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-15/127805231036310.xml&coll=1.
88. Kirkham, supra note 87.
89. See Press Release, Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint Info. Ctr., Coast Guard Announces
New Procedures for Media Access to Boom Safety Zones (July 12, 2010), http://www.restorethe
gulf.gov/release/2010/07/12/coast-guard-announces-new-procedures-media-access-boom-safety-
zones; see also Chris Kirkham, Media Allowed to Enter 'Safety Zones', TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), July 14, 2010, at A6.
90. See Transparency Memorandum, supra note 15, at 4685 ("Transparency promotes
accountability and provides information for citizens about what their government is doing."). Or,
in the case of the sluggish response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, what the government and
BP were not doing.
91. As Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi wryly observed when questioned about President
Obama's C-SPAN commitment, "Really? . . . There are a number of things that [President
Obama) swore on the campaign trail." Keefe, supra note 80, at Al.
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ineffective and incompetent). The third example, involving the invoca-
tion of the state secrets privilege, reflects a much darker side of the
Obama Administration and suggests, perhaps, that The Who's rather
pessimistic assessment of the possibility of "change we can believe in"
was perhaps spot-on. 92
The Obama Administration has continued to press the state secrets
privilege (initially invoked by the George W. Bush Department of Jus-
tice) to block litigation involving credible allegations of government
contractors facilitating extraordinary renditions (done for the purpose of
relocating persons held by the federal government to jurisdictions in
which it is possible to torture them without meaningful legal
consequence). 93
Writing for the panel that initially rejected the Obama Administra-
tion's attempt to preclude Mr. Mohamed's suit from being adjudicated
on the merits, Judge Michael D. Hawkins explained why the state
secrets privilege must be construed narrowly to avoid indirectly sanc-
tioning unconstitutional government action:
Separation-of-powers concerns take on an especially important role
in the context of secret Executive conduct. As the Founders of this
Nation knew well, arbitrary imprisonment and torture under any cir-
cumstance is a "'gross and notorious .. . act of despotism."' Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) . . . (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting 1 Blackstone 131-33 (1765)). But "'confinement [and
abuse] of the person, by secretly hurrying him to [prison], where his
sufferings are unknown or forgotten; is a less public, a less striking,
and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government."' Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 Blackstone 131-33 (1765)) (empha-
sis added). Thus it was "'the central judgment of the Framers of the
Constitution"' that "[w]hatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envi-
sions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
92. See THE WHO, supra note 1.
93. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 949-52 (2009), rev'd en banc,
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). This strategy came as a surprise to the panel hearing the case, as
well as to progressive supporters of President Obama. See Schwartz, supra note 77, at A12.
Andrew D. Romero, executive director of the ACLU, condemned this decision:
This is not change.... [t]his is definitely more of the same. Candidate Obama ran
on a platform that would reform the abuse of state secrets, but President Obama's
Justice Department has disappointingly reneged on that important civil liberties
issue. If this is a harbinger of things to come, it will be a long and arduous road to
give us back an America we can be proud of again.
Id.
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stake." Id. at 536 . . . (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 380 . . . (1989)).94
Judge Hawkins then defined the scope of the state secrets privilege
narrowly, and concluded that "[t]he subject matter of this action there-
fore is not a state secret, and the case should not have been dismissed at
the outset."95 This disposition, in turn, permitted Mr. Mohamed to con-
tinue his efforts to prosecute his suit against Jeppesen for facilitating his
unlawful capture, relocation, imprisonment, and torture.96
In thinking about the importance of government accountability, and
its relationship to the project of democratic deliberation, disclosure of
whether the federal government hired a subsidiary of Boeing to facilitate
the kidnapping and subsequent torture of foreign nationals seems far
more important than whether the Census Bureau makes its data sets
available to sociologists on a timely basis.97 Moreover, the fact that the
Obama Administration seems anxious to sweep the alleged sins of the
George W. Bush Administration under the rug appears radically incon-
sistent with its promise of transparent, accountable governance.9 8
I do not know precisely the requirements of the War on Terror, and
I cannot speak to the necessity or value of the program that Jeppesen
allegedly helped to facilitate on behalf of the federal government. If the
allegations contained in the Mohamed complaint are even half true,
however, it suggests that our government is not living up either to our
national ideals or to the requirements of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, it
94. Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 956.
95. Id.
96. The panel remanded the case back to the district court, where it permitted the federal
government another opportunity to establish that the state secrets privilege would preclude
adjudication of Mr. Mohamed's lawsuit:
On remand, the government must assert the privilege with respect to secret evidence
(not classified information), and the district court must determine what evidence is
privileged and whether any such evidence is indispensable either to plaintiffs' prima
facie case or to a valid defense otherwise available to Jeppesen. Only if privileged
evidence is indispensable to either party should it dismiss the complaint.
Id. at 962. Strictly speaking, then, Judge Hawkins's panel opinion did not absolutely preclude
application of the state secrets privilege in this case.
97. See DATA.GOV OPERATIONs DRAFT, supra note 72, at 4-6 (describing the Obama
Administration's "Data.gov" initiative to make government held data more widely available to
both the general public and academic researchers).
98. In fact, the Administration has not offered any meaningful alternative to judicial review of
allegations of kidnapping and torture, such as, for example, some form of congressional oversight.
As one observer has noted, President Obama's new policy on the invocation of the state secrets
doctrine "doesn't necessarily carry a lot of weight in regards to the state secrets doctrine," and,
moreover, President Obama has "failed to mention any greater judicial review of the facts
underpinning an executive assertion of the privilege, and described only the barest step towards a
notional congressional oversight role." Clint Hendler, Parsing Obama on State Secrets, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (May 21, 2009, 4:40 PM), http://www.cjr.org/campaign-desk/parsing-obama
onstatesecrets.php.
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seems very odd for an administration committed to "transparency, par-
ticipation, and openness" to hide behind the state secrets privilege to
avoid explaining highly questionable government actions undertaken
incident to the War on Terror.99
At the same time, it would be naive, perhaps hopelessly so, to
expect any administration to be transparent about CIA-operated illegal
kidnapping, detention, and torture programs. Yet, if our government is
no longer engaged in such activities, and, as President Obama opined on
his first day in office, "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants," oo
why has the Obama Administration continued to hide this alleged gov-
ernment misconduct behind the state secrets privilege shield? If, as Pres-
ident Bush repeatedly told the nation, "[the United States] does not
torture,"1 'o there should not be any substance to the Mohamed
complaint.
Yet, the federal government's fierce determination to preclude the
federal courts from reaching the merits of the Mohamed complaint sug-
gests that the allegations probably have more than a little basis in fact.
Indeed, as Judge Hawkins warned, "[a] rule that categorically equated
'classified' matters with 'secret' matters would, for example, perversely
encourage the President to classify politically embarrassing information
simply to place it beyond the reach of judicial process."' 02
99. But cf Bob Egelko, Court Reinstates Suit in CIA Rendition Case, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 29,
2009, at A8 (noting that the Obama Administration argued before the Ninth Circuit that Mr.
Mohamed's lawsuit should be dismissed under the state secrets privilege, adopting the legal
arguments of the George W. Bush Administration's Department of Justice, arguing that "any
lawsuit by the alleged torture victims could reveal national security secrets, such as government-
sanctioned interrogation methods and the CIA's relationships with contractors" and therefore
could not be permitted to proceed). Judge Hawkins had a powerful response to the
Administration's argument that permitting the suit to proceed would unduly impair national
security:
According to the government's theory, the Judiciary should effectively cordon off
all secret government actions from judicial scrutiny, immunizing the CIA and its
partners from the demands and limits of the law.
We reject this interpretation . . . not only because it is unsupported by the case law,
but because it forces an unnecessary zero-sum decision between the Judiciary's
constitutional duty "to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 . . . (1803), and the Executive's constitutional duty "to preserve the
national security," United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 880 . . .
(1982). We simply need not place the "co-equal branches of the Government" on an
all-or-nothing "collision course." Cheney, 542 U.S. at 389 . . .
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 955 (2009).
100. FOIA Memorandum, supra note 38, at 4683.
101. Frank Rich, Op-Ed., The 'Good' Germans Among Us, N.Y. TMEs (Sunday Late Edition),
Oct. 14, 2007, § 4, at 13 (quoting former President Bush as claiming that "[tihis government does
not torture people.").
102. Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 959.
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The fact that, as a candidate, President Obama promised greater
transparency and accountability for these government policies only
exacerbates the inconsistency of the Administration's approach in this
area.'0 It also undermines, and indeed betrays, the Administration's
ostensible commitment to securing the accountability of the government
to the people. If we do not know precisely what the George W. Bush
Administration did, and perhaps even what this Administration is pres-
ently doing, how can "We, the People," make even a pretense of holding
those responsible for these evil policies accountable?'"'
Nor is the state secrets question the only example of this sort of
important backsliding on transparency. 0 5 As a presidential candidate,
Senator Obama attacked the Bush Administration's warrantless domes-
tic spying programs before voting in June 2008 for an extension of the
Patriot Act that provided telecommunications companies with compre-
hensive retroactive immunity for their cooperation in these programs."
By supporting comprehensive, retroactive immunity, Obama rendered it
highly unlikely (and probably impossible) for the American people to
ever learn the full scope and effects of these unconstitutional govern-
ment activities. Once again, transparency might have advanced account-
ability in this context, but since taking office, President Obama has done
nothing to facilitate disclosures involving the scope and scale of these
programs, which, unlike the covert extraordinary rendition, detention,
and torture programs, undoubtedly involved invasions of the constitu-
tional rights of U.S. citizens.
Perhaps, as Emerson warned us, "[a] foolish consistency is the
hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers
and divines."' 7 If this is so, then President Obama certainly does not
103. See Charlie Savage, Obama Moves to Curb Secrecy with Order on Classified Documents,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 2009, at A19 ("As a presidential candidate, Mr. Obama campaigned on a
theme of making the government less secretive. But in office his record has been more ambiguous,
drawing fire from advocates of open government by embracing Bush-era claims that certain
lawsuits involving surveillance and torture must be shut down to protect state secrets.").
104. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Reclaiming America's Soul, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at
A27 (arguing that those responsible for the Bush Administration torture policies must be held
accountable and positing that "the only way we can regain our moral compass, not just for the
sake of our position in the world, but for the sake of our own national conscience, is to investigate
how that happened, and, if necessary, to prosecute those responsible.").
105. See Jim Harper, A Flagging Obama Transparency Effort, CATO@LIBERTY.ORG (Apr. 9,
2009, 6:31 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/a-flagging-obama-transparency-effort (noting that
the White House has failed to honor its pledge to post all bills pending before the President on the
White House website "for five days before he sign[ed] them.").
106. See Michael Gerson, Editorial, The Audacity of Cynicism, WASH. PosT, July 2, 2008, at
A15; see also Editorial, The Quest for the Middle, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), July 14, 2008, at
A 12.
107. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 138 (Brooks Atkinson ed., modem library ed. 1992).
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fall within the category of "little statesman and philosophers and
divines," at least if one considers in broader strokes his Administration's
willingness to actually practice the commitment to transparency and
openness that it proclaims. In the case of the state secrets privilege and
immunity for participation in domestic spying programs, this inconsis-
tency reflects poorly on the values of a President who once taught con-
stitutional law at one of the nation's finest law schools. On the other
hand, however, the notion that transparency, in and of itself, always and
everywhere constitutes a public good, is a proposition that reasonable
people can, and probably should, contest.
V. PROCESS VALUES CANNOT BE THE SOLE METRIC IN EVALUATING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, NOR Is FORMALISTIC
OPENNESS TO PUBLIC INPUT AND PARTICIPATION
NECESSARILY A GOOD THING
At the end of the day, a thoroughgoing commitment to transparency
probably matters less than reliably and consistently achieving desirable
policy outcomes. Again, I do not wish to be construed as endorsing the
proposition that the ends inevitably justify the means; such an approach
would sanction gross violations of human rights and basic human dig-
nity.'0 With that caveat, however, I harbor serious doubts about
whether most Americans really care whether the health care bill negotia-
tions are televised on C-SPAN, as much as they care about a health
reform bill advancing sensible policies in a coherent fashion.
The Constitution itself arguably provides the best example of this
proposition. If Brian Lamb's eighteenth century equivalent had publi-
cized the debates at the Federal Convention in 1787, we probably would
have Queen Elizabeth II on our coinage today. Hard bargaining can
require secrecy. Indeed, secrecy can be highly conducive to candor. It is
naive to think that the Chamber of Commerce or the American Petro-
leum Association would negotiate in private in the same way as its pub-
lic press releases read.
Thus, in any administrative process, an affected industry or public
interest group's willingness to compromise will not necessarily be visi-
ble on the face of its public comments and press releases. Forcing all of
the public's business to be conducted in the open might well impede
108. See Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism Within the LW, JEWISH
VIRTuAL LIBRARY (Jan. 2, 2005), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/sctterror.
html (citing HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel 53(4) PD 817, 9-13); see
also Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16, 148-53 (2002); Richard Goldstone, Zero Tolerance for
Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 343, 343-46 (2006).
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getting the public's business done effectively. Simply put, fierce com-
promises and hard bargaining are easier to accomplish when the cameras
are not rolling.
To be sure, public participation in the project of governance is a
wonderful notion, and the civic republican ideal of an active, engaged
citizenry has many attractive characteristics.10 9 Administrative agencies,
however, probably lack the capacity to consider meaningfully hundreds,
or even thousands, of citizen comments (most of which are likely to
constitute form responses organized by interest groups anyway). The
best way for citizens to make their views known is through associations
that have credibility with agencies because they are capable of seeking
judicial review of agency action. As between opening EPA rule making
proceedings to the fine burghers of Peoria, and allowing the Sierra Club
to challenge Clean Water Act regulations before the D.C. Circuit, let's
not mistake the larger constraint on agency bad behavior.
One also should consider carefully what the result of that participa-
tion will be if large numbers of citizens elect to accept the Obama
Administration's invitation to participate in regulatory government. If
citizens attempt to engage federal agencies regarding pending regulatory
matters only to be ignored or patronized by generic form responses, I
would argue that the net effect will be to reduce, rather than enhance,
citizens' confidence in the federal government. We know, based on the
work of scholars like Tom Tyler, that the quality of process fundamen-
tally affects how people respond to adverse outcomes; people who feel
that they were taken seriously will accept an adverse outcome more
readily, and more cheerfully, than people who feel that they were
ignored, degraded, or perhaps both.110
If federal agencies, pursuant to the Obama Administration's
"Google government" initiatives, create ersatz forms of citizen participa-
tion, it will almost certainly do more harm than good. "Collaboration"
and "participation" mean more than simply agreeing to support the regu-
latory priorities and proposals of the incumbent administration. If gov-
ernment encourages citizens to engage agencies substantively, then
agencies must have the ability, including the requisite staffing levels, to
engage these citizen concerns. I fear, however, that form automated
109. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541, 1545-54
(1988); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102
HARV. L. REv. 1695 (1989); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1511 (1992).
110. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
60-92, 100-05 (1988); Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19-20, 57-68, 104-12,
125-57, 170-78, 234-35 (1990); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A
Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedural Reform, 45 Am. J. COMP. L. 871, 887-92 (1997).
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responses, based on mathematical algorithms, will probably constitute
the second most common agency response were large numbers of ordi-
nary people to attempt to participate in administrative proceedings. A
complete failure to respond, in any way, shape, or form, to unsolicited
citizen comments, would be my prediction for the most probable
outcome.
Even if one brackets the difficulties of implementing these new
efforts to encourage and facilitate more direct forms of citizen involve-
ment in the regulatory process, there remain questions about the ability
of the White House, and the OMB, to effectively force agencies to adopt
a new communications paradigm. The hard truth is that old agency hab-
its often die hard, and changing the culture of an agency staffed with
career workers often proves more difficult than presidents, or OMB
directors, realize or anticipate.
Perhaps the most promising of the new transparency reforms
involves the change in favor of a presumption of disclosure in the con-
text of FOIA requests. Again, agency compliance with this directive
might well prove to be less than optimal-in fact, only time will tell.
The first question will be whether, in practice, agency employees
charged with responding to FOIA requests actually incorporate this new
standard into their day-to-day operations. But, this presumes that some-
one will actually consider, substantively, a particular FOIA request.
Many federal agencies maintain shockingly high FOIA request
backlogs, meaning that no one has actually made any effort to respond
to requests, often for periods of months, if not years, and, in more than a
few instances, decades.111
Does the OMB plan to conduct FOIA compliance spot checks to
force laggard agencies to actually process FOIA requests on a timely
basis? And, if not, precisely what consequence will a noncompliant
agency face for failing to operate in a fashion consistent with the admin-
istration's transparency, participation, and collaboration policies?
Thus, whether in practice the new FOIA enforcement imperative,
or limits on the invocation of the state secrets privilege, change agency
behavior in practice very much remains to be seen. Again, it bears not-
ing that many, if not most, federal agencies have a multi-year FOIA
backlog, some stretching out to twenty years.1 12
111. See Editorial, Let the Sun Shine on Records, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 2009, at A10 ("Under
the law, federal agencies are supposed to respond to FOIA requests within 20 days. But, in 2007, a
report by the Knight Foundation and the National Security Archive watchdog group found 12
agencies with FOIA backlogs of 10 years of more. One request to the State Department had
languished for two decades.").
112. Requests for Records Continue To Pile Up Despite Bush Order, STAR-LEDGER (Newark),
Mar. 17, 2008, at A4 (reporting on massive FOIA request backlogs at many federal agencies);
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Clearing the backlog will require staff. Staff requires money.
Unless I have missed something, the FOIA initiative did nothing to rede-
ploy agency staff to clear the existing backlog of FOIA requests. One
can only get to the point of facing a refusal to deliver information after
an agency finds the records that you have requested. If this process is
measured in years (or decades), the exemptions process seems less rele-
vant than agency indifference to acting on FOIA requests in the first
place. And, at an agency like FEMA, do we really want staff time used
on prompt FOIA request answers rather than on planning how to deliver
food and water if a Richter scale 7.2 magnitude earthquake strikes San
Francisco or Seattle? Should we prioritize locating MMS records solic-
ited from the Department of the Interior, or should we focus every avail-
able agency resource on establishing and executing an effective oil
exploration safety and spill response protocol?
At the risk of sounding unduly cynical, I question whether the
Obama Administration's new commitment to transparency, participa-
tion, and collaboration will secure better, more effective governance. If
forced to choose between transparency, participation, and collaboration,
on the one hand, and an effective and efficient government agency on
the other, I would prefer the latter.
At a larger level of abstraction, I wonder whether accountability is
really what we want. It is true that transparency facilitates accountabil-
ity, but it also might impede effective government. If addressing global
warming effectively requires secret, off-the-record negotiations between
the White House, Congress, the EPA, and large scale industrial pol-
luters, I would gladly and happily sacrifice transparency, participation,
and short term accountability for an effective policy that addresses a
global crisis. Consider too that, at least in the context of legislation or
regulation, the outcome of the secret negotiations will have to become
public as part of the legislative process itself. A bill cannot become a
law without votes on the floor of the House of Representatives and the
Senate. Moreover, consistent parliamentary practice in both chambers
also includes consideration of pending legislation by committees of
jurisdiction. Thus, the legislative process could not be more open to the
public, and private negotiations that inform the content of a bill do not,
and constitutionally cannot, mean that a bill's content will remain pri-
vate if it is to become a law.
Scott Shane, Survey Finds Action on Information Requests Can Take Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2007, at Al5 ("The Freedom of Information Act requires a federal agency to provide an initial
response to a request within 20 days and to provide the documents in a timely manner. But the
oldest pending request uncovered in a new survey of 87 agencies and departments has been
awaiting a response for 20 years, and 16 requesters have been waiting more than 15 years for
results.").
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So too, in most cases, will an agency's internal deliberations about
a regulatory question eventually give way to a public proceeding, such
as a notice-and-comment rule-making or a formal adjudication. Even in
cases where the public process is limited or even non-existent (as might
be the case for many informal adjudications), the possibility of judicial
review ensures that an agency cannot keep its reasoning secret from the
public indefinitely. When mechanisms for disclosure and accountability
exist post-enactment, pre-enactment transparency need not constitute an
indispensable component of effective governance or wise policymaking.
Of course, the ultimate form of accountability, at least in a democ-
racy, is free and fair elections held with reasonable regularity. At the end
of the day, the Obama Administration need not worry about accountabil-
ity; it will face accountability at the polls in 2010 in an indirect fashion
and more directly in the 2012 federal elections. When government must
answer at regular intervals to the voters, the need for an ongoing dialec-
tic with the electorate on a day-to-day, issue-by-issue basis seems non-
essential. In other words, the need for congressional action on legisla-
tion, the availability of judicial review of most agency actions, and the
certainty of regular elections all contribute to the accountability of the
federal government. Creating new forms of accountability and participa-
tion that attempt to inject the body politic into administrative decision-
making might add a new dimension or vector of accountability, but I do
not think that we presently suffer from any serious deficits on this score.
Moreover, there is always a potential tension between process val-
ues and substantive outcomes. Mussolini made the trains run on time; I
certainly do not advocate abandoning process values if doing so makes
effective government action easier (and the Framers did not leave this
choice open to the president in any event). But, assessing the costs and
benefits of enhanced process involves careful and systematic considera-
tion of whether enhanced process actually yields better results in a par-
ticular policy context. This is a fair question to raise in response to the
Obama Administration's generic and universal commitments to open
and transparent federal government operations.
V. CONCLUSION
As between "Google government" (in which we know when the
President takes a water break in his meeting with Gordon Brown and
who received a White House Christmas card in 2009)," and a govern-
ment that can deliver emergency services reliably and effectively in
Haiti or New Orleans, it seems reasonable to at least ask if competence
113. See Jose Antonio Vargas, e-Hail to the Chief, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2008, at Cl.
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is more important than transparency because in some circumstances
(including, for example, negotiations on the content of a major health
care reform bill) transparency will likely be the enemy of good govern-
ment. Thus, we sometimes must choose-and the Obama Administra-
tion will be forced to choose-between meeting the imperatives of its
open government initiative and meeting the substantive needs of the
American people.
When effective governance requires something less than total trans-
parency, we should view this as an essential concession to the realities
of governance. Indeed, we should not expect complete transparency
when its practice is antithetical to achieving important government
objectives and the government itself is not engaged in behavior that
transgresses constitutional imperatives, such as honoring a baseline con-
cept of due process that prevents our government, or its agents, from
using torture as primary means of gathering intelligence.
Ironically, perhaps, the Obama Administration's commitment to
transparent and open government seems to apply with most certainty in
contexts where, quite literally, there is likely little to hide and, even if
there were, the prospect of judicial review of agency action under the
Administrative Procedure Act would provide a bulwark against truly ter-
rible government policymaking. In a context such as credible allegations
of extraordinary renditions for the purpose of indefinitely imprisoning
and torturing a detainee, however, it seems to me that our most basic
constitutional values are squarely at issue, and the government's need to
embrace transparency ought to be at its zenith. Yet, in this circumstance,
the Obama Administration's commitment to transparency and open gov-
ernment is something less than total.
For transparency to facilitate accountability, it must include matters
both large and small, and contexts in which disclosure could signifi-
cantly and negatively impact our attitude toward our government and its
agents. To commit to transparency in contexts where the stakes are low
is not to make much of a commitment at all. If the George W. Bush
Administration took government secrecy to absurd lengths, restoring a
policy that favors disclosure in most circumstances simply reflects a
return to a reasonable status quo; it surely does not reflect progress or
change we can believe in.
As much as I hope that my pessimistic view understates the Obama
Administration's commitment to meaningful transparency in circum-
stances where disclosure could prove damaging to the Administration's
reputation-for example, in matters such as extraordinary renditions for
the purpose of torturing persons held in the custody of the federal gov-
ernment, or the considerably less awful, but still patently unconstitu-
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tional, activities such as domestic spying programs that involve the
surveillance of U.S. citizens' telephone conversations without a war-
rant-I fear that the desire to suppress politically embarrassing informa-
tion does not wear a partisan label.
All presidents, of whatever party, seek to avoid disclosing informa-
tion that makes them and their administrations appear anything less than
sterling.114 In this respect, then, the Who's admonition, "meet the new
boss, same as the old boss,""' has salience, even in the context of an
administration that, as a general matter, wishes to distinguish itself
favorably through its commitment to open, transparent government.
114. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, Nonprofit Fund Faces Questions About Conflicts and
Selection Procedures, N.Y. THWEs, Aug. 22, 2010, at A15 (reporting on ethical questions
surrounding grants approved by the Social Innovation Fund, "a new $50 million federal program
aimed at financing the replication of nonprofit programs that work" and noting that calls for
transparency grow as millions in grants are awarded). In this case, "what was supposed to have
been an emblem of the administration's commitment to nonprofit groups has become instead a
messy controversy over potential conflicts of interest and the process used to select the grantees."
Id.
115. THE WHO, supra note 1.
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